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When the first tank turns the corner - the question of the willingness to fight for the country in the light of dry facts

From time to time, the question "Would you fight for your country?", a question that is particularly suitable for stirring up emotions, comes up in public discourse. The answer to this question, either in the negative or with an insufficiently definite affirmative, is practically taboo and is followed by social stigmatisation. It is no wonder that in times of escalating regional armed conflicts, the topic can become an effective tool for thematizing public discourse, political mobilization, and even character assassination. In this paper, we try to free the subject from the inevitable political frills and focus exclusively on the scientific facts to examine the responses of the masses to this highly theoretical issue at the global level.

When the first tank turns the corner - the question of the willingness to fight for the country in the light of dry facts

The problem of methodology: loudmouth yes-men, latent defenders

It is worth starting our reflection by noting that almost all academic research on the willingness to die for one's country is highly theoretical. Studies are conducted with the hypothesis that the answer to the question "Would you fight for your country in an armed conflict?" is unverifiable. Depending on upbringing, values, temperament, and family situation, the answers may vary, but they have one thing in common: we do not know whether, in an actual, live situation, the respondent would act as they have previously indicated.

Although this criticism is usually leveled at those subjects who answer in the affirmative, for the sake of completeness, it is worth noting that the 'hit or run' rule of thumb in evolutionary psychology can be reversed. That is, in a respondent who, for various reasons (be it pacifism, protection of the family, or other reasons) finds it inconceivable to answer yes to the question, the specific threat can easily activate motivations that drive behaviour and ultimately lead him to fight (ironically, often the very same reasons that led him to answer no).

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Despite the methodological challenge, researchers remain optimistic about the potential for future advancements. With the evolution of neuroscience and brain imaging diagnostics, the situation may change, and the methodological barriers may be partially overcome. This hope for future progress keeps the field dynamic and the reader engaged.

Do you believe what you say? The answer of brain imaging diagnostics

While not explicitly looking at homeland security, studies have been conducted in which researchers have been able to address at least part of this methodological problem using fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging). FMRI was used to determine whether the subjects believed they would act in a situation as they indicated in their response.

The ARTIS research group was interested in the relationship between religious sacred values (values on which we do not compromise) and armed conflict and terrorism. To this end, several field studies have been carried out with members of various terrorist organisations and radical groups. The results of these studies all showed the same thing: whether it was the Catalan independence movement, jihadists, or Kurdish militants, sacred values were so strong that members of these groups would have sacrificed their lives for them. These findings have made researchers wonder: Are these sacred values and causes so deeply rooted that our brains process them differently from any less critical issue? Researchers conducted a unique and somewhat risky experiment to find the answer to this question. The experiment involved using fMRI to study the brains of Islamic radicals. The test subjects (of Moroccan and Pakistani origin) were recruited in Barcelona, which, at the time of the research, was one of the leading recruiting grounds for the Islamic State.

The first experiment involved highly radicalised Pakistani subjects who explicitly supported Al-Qaeda affiliate Lashkar-e-Taiba, violence against the Western world, and armed jihad. These participants clearly stated that they would be willing to use violence in the name of armed jihad. During the experiment, the subjects were asked to express both sacred values (e.g. "The Prophet Muhammad should never be depicted in a cartoon" or "Public schools should be required to serve halal food", etc.) and essential but not sacred values (e.g. "women's right to wear the hijab", "compulsory teaching of Islam in schools", etc.) were shown on a screen and asked to rank their willingness to fight and die on a scale for each value presented. As participants ranked these values and issues, the fMRI machine recorded what was happening in each area of their brains. 

While the highly radicalized Pakistani men were prioritizing their sacred values, interestingly, an area of their brain (the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) was deactivated. This brain area is associated with reflective thinking and the evaluation of cost-benefit calculations. Meanwhile, another area of their brain (the ventromedial prefrontal cortex) showed increased activity when subjects reported a high propensity to fight and die for a value. This increased activation occurred in the part of the brain associated with subjective evaluation ("How much is this worth to me?"). But what does this mean in practical terms?

In everyday life, i.e., regarding non-sacred values, these two areas of the brain (the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex) work closely together in decision-making. Imagine you are in a restaurant, and you see some delicious tiramisu. We think, "Oh my god, I'm craving that tiramisu. Wow, that would be delicious". Then, we think for a second and consider that this tiramisu contains many calories, and we are about to start a healthier lifestyle anyway. Our dorsolateral prefrontal cortex provides this response. We weigh and hesitate; we reconsider. These two brain parts typically work together in this way and participate in decision-making.

This is exactly how things worked in the experiment, when participants reported low willingness to fight and die for values that were not considered sacred. In these cases, therefore, subjective evaluation was regulated and controlled by mechanisms of decision control. However, when participants showed a high propensity to fight and die for a sacred value, these two regions of the brain became more disconnected. This suggests that when someone is willing to kill and be killed in defence of an ideal, they no longer automatically use the decision control mechanisms typically involved in deliberative thinking. In essence, these individuals turn off this part of their brain. It is essential to see that this is an automatic response; the person has no choice: they have to do it because it is the right thing to do, and they don't care about the consequences!

Researchers have also been highly interested in what mechanisms might reduce people's willingness to fight and die for a value or cause. In the second part of the study, participants were shown each value again with their original ranking to shed light on the answer. However, this time, subjects were allowed to press a button to see the willingness to fight and die of the average Pakistani resident of Barcelona for the same values. However, these averages were fictitious: in half of the cases, the data were manipulated to show that the average Pakistani ranked each value similarly. In the other half of the cases, however, the data were lower, i.e., the data showed that the average Pakistani was less willing to fight and die for sacred values. The researchers then allowed participants to re-answer the questionnaire and change their ranking.

Interestingly, the subjects reduced their willingness to fight and die for sacred and non-sacred values to be more in line with the responses of the average Pakistani. A reopening and reactivation of the brain pathways responsible for deliberation accompanied this change of opinion. If these results hold up, it is possible that peer pressure could divert these individuals towards a different way of thinking. In other words, if we see that a value we consider essential is not equally important to the group or community we refer to, we may adjust our view to the group. 

FMri has not yet investigated the question of the willingness to die for one's country, but this is probably only a matter of time. In any case, it is clear from the above research that there are values in which we can believe to the extent that we are convinced that we would be willing to sacrifice our lives for them. With such values, our brains become less capable of reflection and counter-argument. In other words, it is conceivable that for a person who answers yes to the question 'would you fight for your country', their responses at the neural level reinforce their answer. He believes that he would fight and give his life for his country. Brain imaging still cannot address the problem of whether the person being asked would stand by his answer in a real, live situation. It can, however, give more significant meaning and weight to a theoretical 'yes' answer and confirm the depth of conviction with which the person has given their answer. 

After this methodological digression, let's return to the original question and examine the answers to the question, 'Would you fight for your country?' globally.

Declining global willingness versus growing regional belligerence 

The World Values Survey (WVS) is an academic research project that has asked people in over 100 countries worldwide the same question for decades: "Would you be willing to fight for your country?" Almost all of the research on the subject draws on WVS databases collected since 1981. Still, independent studies, such as the Gallup Institution's annual surveys, ask a similar question, albeit with a smaller sample.

At a global level, the results show that the propensity to fight has declined over the last 10 years. For example, in 2014, when we witnessed Russia's annexation of Crimea, 61% worldwide answered 'yes' to the question and 27% 'no'.In 2024, the percentage of 'yes' answers declined to 55%, and 'no' answers increased to 33%. In other words, one in two adults worldwide say they would fight for their country in the event of war, one-third say no, and the rest are not sure.

However, after closer inspection, I found that the situation is much more complicated. Scientists have interpreted the general global decline in the propensity to fight in recent decades as a shift towards post-theroic societies. However, a more detailed analysis of the data nuances this view and shows that factors such as increasing levels of patriotism in a society, a nation's proximity to armed conflict, or an ongoing territorial dispute increase the propensity to fight. 

Worldwide, there is a clear divide between the South/East and North/West regarding attitudes towards the willingness to fight for their country. While citizens in the EU (32%), the US (41%) and Canada (34%) are much less willing to fight for their country if there were a war, people in Western Asia (77%), the Middle East, where tensions are still high (73%) and India (76%) are much more willing to fight for their country if necessary. The exception in Europe is countries outside the EU, where people are more willing to defend their country personally if there is a war - 60% say they would be willing to fight.

By country, the most willing to fight (answering yes) are Armenia (96%), Saudi Arabia (94%), Azerbaijan (88%), Pakistan (86%), and Georgia (83%). The least willing (answering no) are Italy (78%), Austria (62%), Germany (57%), Nigeria (54%), and Spain (53%).

In Russia, 32% (compared to 59% ten years ago) say they are ready to go to war for their country if necessary, 20% say they are not, and a significant 48% say they "don't know". It should be noted, of course, that this question was asked in a country where opposition to war is a criminal offence. In Ukraine, people are more willing to defend their country personally - 62% (no change from ten years ago)- but 33% say they would not.

Interestingly, in Europe, some highly democratic societies, notably the Nordic countries, including Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, report high levels of belligerence. One possible explanation is that these countries have maintained mainly compulsory military service. Indeed, comprehensive data analyses show a positive correlation between mandatory military service and citizens' willingness to fight. In Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, the world's four most prosperous and peaceful countries, two-thirds or more citizens say they are willing to fight (all close to Russia). Their expanding armed forces also have no problem finding soldiers: military service is compulsory for young people in all four countries.

Perhaps it is not surprising that the proximity of a neighbouring or nearby state in conflict or an ongoing armed conflict increases citizens' willingness to fight. This helps explain why countries close to Russia are less pigeon-toed in Europe. As mentioned above, Poland (72.6%), Estonia (61.3%), and Finland (74.8%) are worth considering.

Of course, the obvious question arises: what about Hungarian respondents? According to WVS data from 2017 to 2022, 54.5% of Hungarian respondents answered yes and 35% no to this question. Based on this period, the countries that we have outperformed in terms of willingness to fight include Romania (49.6%), Germany (44.8%), the Czech Republic (42.9%), Austria (40.8%), the Netherlands (38.1%), Italy (37.3%), Slovakia (35.4%), Spain (33.5%).

Unfortunately, more recent international research data is not available. For the sake of completeness, it is worth noting that the Publicus Institute conducted a similar survey in 2022. According to their answers, if there were a war involving Hungary, one in two (51%) of those surveyed would prefer to fight for their country. However, slightly less than half of respondents (45%) would not do so in the event of a war conflict. If another country attacked Hungary, six in ten (62%) would fight to defend their country. However, a third (35%) would prefer not to use force in such a situation.

Some surprising results: the anti-war right and patriotic migrants 

One interesting finding of the relevant research is that political orientation is not always a reliable predictor of the propensity to fight. For example, radical rights are not as ready to fight in Germany and the Netherlands as one would intuitively assume. Research in these countries found that those who wanted to vote for far-left or far-right parties were less likely to show a willingness to fight for their country. Those who supported centrist parties, such as the German Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, were more willing to do so.

Another exciting research result comes from the United States. It is worth noting at the outset that the United States has struggled to meet its recruitment targets in recent years. The US has 1.3 million active duty soldiers, or 2 million if you include reservists. That's about 1% of the adult population, which is falling yearly as recruitment falls short of recruitment targets. The country is a multi-ethnic democratic society that has relied on a volunteer force for decades and has a substantial immigration while the population ages. Immigrants make up 14% of the US population.

A recent study recorded a fascinating finding: Immigrants to the United States are more willing to serve in the armed services of these countries than native-born citizens. In other words, immigrants' commitment to the United States may be much stronger than people first think. They value and embrace the values and opportunities the United States provides so much that they are even more willing to fight for them than native-born U.S. citizens. With the declining birth rate and interest in military careers, immigrants are thus likely to become a vital source of recruiting needs. 

In the United States, the most willing countries were China, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Germany, Mexico, Philippines, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom. The study also found that willingness to serve in the armed services was motivated more by immigrants' desire for civic attachment than militarism or nationalism. This research finding aligns with what researchers have discovered about Brexit: a third of settled migrants were pro-Brexit, which many interpret as a success of immigrant integration. The relevant theory is that the more integrated newcomers are into a society, the more their preferences are the same as the native population.

Hirdetés

2025-02

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